




This chapter offers a systematically oriented and historically informed examination
of the notions of “life,” “world,” and “worldview” as they are articulated in classical
hermeneutical thinking, particularly in relation to its intellectual context in the
works of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger. I focus on the
contrast and tensions between life explained as a naturalistic physical and biological
phenomenon, life as felt and intuited directly through the self, and life understood as
an interpretive social-historical enactment; and between world as factically, empiri-
cally, and immediately given and world as constituted and generated through rela-
tional contexts of sense and meaning that call for indirect processes of explication
and communication to be appropriately enacted and understood.
In addition to examining life and world in their own senses, I consider the inter-
actions between life and world in hermeneutical and phenomenological conceptions
of lived-experience (Erlebnis), worldview (Weltanschauung), lifeworld (Lebenswelt),
world as horizon (Welthorizont), and truth as world-givenness, world-formation, and
world-disclosure. These interpretive conceptions are central from earlier hermeneu-
tical thought to the contemporary situation and task of hermeneutics in the early
twenty-first century. Such conceptions and the experiences they address help illu-
minate epistemic and ontological questions of the subjectivity, shared inter-
subjectivity, and objectivity of life and world that serve as orienting questions for
this survey.
2. Life as natural, socially mediated, and subjective
The ordinary German words for life (Leben) and world (Welt), much like their Eng-
lish equivalents, have taken on an equivocal range of meanings that are not alto-
gether compatible. This dissonance of sense is evident in their intellectual uses and
interpretations of life and world.
In the case of world, for instance, discussants accentuate either the naturalness of
the world, which Husserl described as the “naïve” acceptance of the world as given
in the “natural concept of the world” (natürlicher Weltbegriff), or the constituted and
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mediated formation and sedimentation of meanings into a world, which the later
Husserl called “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt).1 World can be identified with the worlds of
natural, social, and subjective life, as in the early Heidegger’s distinction between
self-(selbst-), with-(mit-), and environing-(um-) worlds.
Life likewise can refer to the factuality of an objectively explainable natural bio-
logical process (e.g. “the life of amoeba”) or to a symbolically and socially mediated
form or way of life of a biographical individual (e.g. “the life of Goethe”) or group of
humans (e.g. “the life of the German working class”). There is a third more sub-
jective personal sense of life, disseminated in individualistic forms of nineteenth-
century Romanticism, life-philosophy, and existentialism, in which my or another’s
life appears to be so singular and unique that a life transcends the general conditions
and features of natural and social life such as – perhaps most radically – in Søren
Kierkegaard’s indirect communications concerning a “non-numerical” and irre-
ducibly singular individual in its interiority.2
In the writings of the nineteenth-century hermeneutical philosopher Dilthey, who
plays a crucial role in the history of the concepts of life and world in hermeneutics
and phenomenology, one finds side by side multiple senses of life in discussions of
organic and bodily life, cultural, historical, and national life, and a personal life too
complex to be reduced to its physical and social conditions. The dictum of Dilthey’s
incomplete multivolume biography of Friedrich Schleiermacher running into thou-
sands of pages is accordingly “the individual is ineffable.”3 Dilthey’s inexpressible
individual diverges, however, from a transcendent incomprehensibility or irrational
singularity: “each life has its own sense.”4 Immanent ineffability points toward the
complex and infinite task of tracing and interpreting the mediations of natural and
social life in an individual life: “The infinite richness of life unfolds itself in indivi-
dual existence because of its relations to its milieu, other humans and things. But
every particular individual is also a crossing point of contexts which move through
and beyond its particular life.”5
“Life” is thoroughly relational and holistic in Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Dilthey
rejected a model of holism that relied on the image of a self-identical biological organism
due to his methodologically prioritizing individual persons. His structural relationality
concerning the external organization of society did not presuppose the real existence of
collective entities. Life is hermeneutical according to Dilthey: the practical effective nexus
of life (Lebenszusammenhang) in its facticity is concurrently the point of departure, the
medium, and the purpose of intersubjectively oriented understanding (Verstehen) and
interpretation (Interpretation or Auslegung). Dilthey recommends interpreting the “lived-
experience” (Erlebnis) and pre-theoretical reflexively felt and aware “feeling of life”
(Lebensgefühl) of individuals through their expression (Ausdruck) and their products and
artifacts. The modes of human life are explicated out of their own worldly comport-
ments and from their “being-there-within life” (Darinnensein im Leben).6
Traditional hermeneutics focused on the clarification of the historical, linguistic,
and psychological conditions of Biblical and classical sources. Understanding and
interpretation are gradually more associated – to a lesser extent in Schleiermacher,
and more overtly in Dilthey – with the autobiographical participant perspective of
personally inflected lived-experience.7 The first-person life-perspective informs and
orients social-historical and epistemic reflectiveness (Besinnung) and those sciences
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that cannot bracket the triple hermeneutic of inquiry into the “human world.” The
human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) remain empirically oriented, methodologically
generated, and systematically structured even as they presuppose, utilize, and inter-
pret a concrete nexus of life.
Informed by multiple senses of “life,” modern central European intellectual tra-
ditions have explained life as a naturalistic physical and biological phenomenon,
perceived life as vitally felt and directly intuitable in the living present, posited life as
a historical realm to be transformed through praxis or as a higher realm of meaning,
value, and validity, and understood life as an already interpretive social-historical
reality. Dilthey approached life as an acquired relational nexus of signification
reflexively felt and practically interpreted with reference to the first person auto-
biographical perspective. Dilthey’s non-theistic personalism is evocative for the non-
naturalistic discourses of life and lifeworld unfolded in subsequent hermeneutics,
phenomenology, and critical social theory.
The language of life-philosophy was also significant for the logical positivism of
the Vienna Circle when it described its wider concerns. Rudolf Carnap was con-
cerned in the 1920s with defending a scientific lifestance (Lebenshaltung) and life-
conception (Lebensaufassung) in the midst of the menacing growth of irrationality
and totalitarianism.8 In the life-philosophical conclusion to the program of the
Ernst Mach Society (Verein Ernst Mach), jointly published in 1929 by Carnap,
Hahn, and Neurath, and dedicated to Schlick in honor of his remaining in Vienna,
science and life as well as knowledge and affectively rooted worldview are affirmed
to be complementary forces in a scientific-oriented life-conception. The love of
science is rooted in an emotional disposition toward knowing the world and
furthering practical life: the scientific lifestance is dedicated to serving life and in
response is taken up by life.9
3. World as given and as constituted
The German word for world (Welt) likewise has an ambiguous range of meanings.
The world can signify this particular world or the singular-plural world as such; it
can be the world in its facticity, givenness, and thereness or the world as it is “given
to me” or “there for me” to use Dilthey’s expressions. The world is not just any
world; it is a “constituted” world in Husserl’s phenomenology and “disclosed” in
Heidegger’s thinking of truth.
World-constitution need not entail the strong idealistic thesis that the world is
mentally dependent or originated. Husserl’s argument concerns instead the active and
passive intentionality of a conscious and bodily subject and its constitution of meaning.
World is in a fundamental sense “my” experiential world within an intended uni-
versal world-horizon (Husserl’s Welthorizont) or it is in each case “my own” (jemeinig)
world disclosed through my way of “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger).10 Husserl
maintained that “my world is the opening in which all experience occurs.”11 The
“I am” is the “primordial intentional foundation of my world” (“der intentionale
Urgrund für meine Welt”); there is nothing that appears outside of the horizon of
“my world” or the first person perspective of the “I am.”12 World is generated,
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constituted, and sedimented through relational contexts of sense and meaning that
presuppose an “I.” This is the transcendental dimension of the “I” or subjectivity of
the first-person perspective that bodily and mentally orients and forms the world.
The word “Lebenswelt” has a long history prior to Husserl, who did not system-
atically use the expression until the late work Crisis of the European Sciences published
in 1936.13 Like the word Umwelt (environing world), earlier usage of the expression
“lifeworld” referred to the environment. Both phrases referred to either a natural set-
ting or a historical cultural milieu in the context of nineteenth-century German
thought. But there is continuity between the two senses as both were interpreted as
relational and interactive. The organism reacts to and acts on its environing lifeworld.
It is the co-relational sense of the constitution and disclosure of the world to the
intentional subject and being-there that Husserl and Heidegger in the 1920s are draw-
ing upon. The fluctuation in the experience and concept of world is evident in the
variations on “world” in hermeneutics and phenomenology such as in Dilthey’s life-
nexus, Husserl’s lifeworld (Lebenswelt), and Heidegger’s environing world (Umwelt).14
4. Life as world picturing
In the following sections, I will explore the problematic of world in the context of
Dilthey’s philosophy of worldviews.
“Worldview” (Weltanschauung) is a concept with roots in German Idealism. It
functions in Fichte and Schelling as an organizing depiction of life.15 A worldview is
the formation of life through the perception or picturing (anschauen) of a world. The
idealistic account of worldview is rejected by Dilthey in support of a hermeneutical
one. A historically situated and self-reflexive life interpretively pictures and forms
a world for itself and expresses and communicates this world in myriad ways
throughout its life. This picturing of world (Weltbild) does not transpire through the
self-intuition or self-assertion of a self or subject. Its world is formed in the self’s
interactive cogivenness with the exteriority of things and others revealed in phenom-
ena such as resistance and misunderstanding. As others make the self-interpretation
and individuation of my life possible through processes of learning and socialization,
one’s world is primarily a “human world” for Dilthey, understood through histori-
cally constituted “life-views” (Lebensanschauungen) that often attempt to transcend
merely human perspectives.
A plurality of life- and world-perspectives emerge as humans are constituted in
social-historical worlds shaped by natural forces, biological drives, practical interests,
sedimented customs and traditions, the reproduction of powerful structures and
institutions, normative-spiritual strivings, and communicative and self-reflection.
Given their varied sources, the sciences of the human world need to be multifaceted.
Unlike the natural sciences that abstract from and bracket their basis in human life,
the human sciences cannot escape from their own reflexivity and the need to self-
reflectively engage the human world in which they transpire, as knowledge of the
human world occurs within that world.16
As worldly embodied life is molded by sentiments and habits, exteriority and
facticity, self-understanding and interpretation cannot be purely conceptual
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processes.17 They involve all dimensions and “faculties” – cognitive and affective –
of human existence. The human sciences can modify but not abolish the passions
and interests of human life that enter into the study of that life. The internally given
world of the self to itself indicates the initial givenness from the first-person per-
spective of co-agents or participants of meaningful social-cultural structures and
processes. The “inner world” refers to the first-person life-context, which is intrin-
sically bodily, perceptual, and worldly as well as social-historical, in which objects
are pre-conceptually and conceptually understood. The “internal” human world is
constituted through social-historically formed practical goods, interests, norms,
purposes, and values.18
The “outer” or “external world” refers to the abstraction of objects from their
life-nexus in the third-person perspective of observation and explanation character-
istic of the modern natural sciences and associated with worldviews such as nat-
uralism and materialism.19 Such worldviews remain metaphysical in affirming one
conclusive picture and truth about the world. Dilthey construes metaphysics as
representing the world through a unified point projected beyond the world in order
to theorize the world as a translucent organized whole.20
Metaphysical statements presuppose a perspective outside of any possible worldly
perspective and conflict with modernity and its skepticism concerning cognizing the
world through the transcendent. Dilthey articulates this claim from the conflict
between the historical consciousness of the present, and its awareness of difference,
with every metaphysics taken as science.21 The aporia between reason and history is
due to reason extending beyond itself and claiming definiteness about the indefinite,
cognitive clarity about what is a product of an affective mood (Stimmung) and his-
torical life nexus.
The historical consciousness of difference stimulates possibilities for skepticism
and relativism. After the end of objective metaphysics, including positivistic pro-
grams of a unified science, to what extent can value, validity, and truth arise in the
multiplicity and relativity of human experiences? Without the metaphysical integra-
tion of one world, which has fallen into paradox and aporia for Dilthey, we are
confronted with myriad incommensurable sources. As Heidegger remarked, being
(Sein) is absent in beings (Seiende); the world has vanished in a plurality of worlds,
and the ontological difference disappears in interminable ontic differences.22
Dilthey described how ontic and empirical multiplicity cannot be joined into one
fixed and stable world-picture or sublimated (aufgehoben) in one integrated external
world.23 Rather than avowing the ultimate coherence of the world and knowledge,
Dilthey unfolded a non-reductive pluralistic empiricism and moderate life-oriented
skepticism in relation to “one world.”
The validity of relativism and skepticism rests in the therapeutic adjustment of
overgeneralized perspectives that reify the established contemporary type of human
being as the natural and universal standard of all forms of life.24 Given the com-
monalities of human existence, understanding and interpretation are not random but
conditional in the life-contexts which they respond to and transform. The indivi-
duality of things does not make any possible interpretation permissible, as it calls
the interpreter to be experientially receptive and responsive to the other phenom-
enally and immanently from out of itself and in its own empirical situation. Insofar
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as we are concerned with universal validity and facticity, commonality and singular-
ity, a morphological-comparative strategy that elucidates individuality in relation to
its context and its others is methodologically appropriate. It requires an epistemic
strategy that includes all ontic and empirical aspects of human existence, and above
all psychology and history.25
5. Living within the historical world
It is erroneous to assert that “[f]or Dilthey, the task of human understanding is to
liberate the social from the empirical” and, as if world-picturing and the empirical
were disconnected categories, it is “an image of the world, a Weltbild, [that] deter-
mines the value of life.”26 Values are not superimposed on life from the outside,
even though they can be coercively applied, since it is life immanently valuing itself
that forms a world-picture, which in turn orients and disorients that life in the ten-
sion between value and facticity. A Weltbild is a dynamic experientially shaped
understanding and picturing of a world rather than a static and immutable “cosmic
picture.”27 Instead of being underway from a doctrinal principle, originary source,
or self-evident intuition to the phenomena, experience and worldview interact and
inform one another as particular and general between part and whole. Dilthey’s
consequently prioritizes the empirical (Empirie), including the appearance of the
unexpected that fractures or reorients a world, while resisting reductive conceptions
of empirical explanation.
Heidegger suspects that Dilthey’s notion of subjectivity remains beholden to a
modern conception of the epistemic and psychological subject that needs to be over-
come.28 This criticism should be seen in relation to Dilthey’s thinking of subjectivity
through embodied worldly life. Subjectivity cannot be isolated in amonadic interiority;
it is bound up with feelings and cognitions responsive to its environing world and life-
context. It consists of interpreting the self’s contextual historicity, which permits and
requires developmental and comparative strategies of description and analysis.
Dilthey introduces the notion of types in this context that he employs in his
morphology of world-pictures. Types have a preliminary heuristic character that
allows them to open up and articulate the singular in relation to its contexts.29 Types
are not irrevocable constructs or irreversible prejudices. Types are the researcher’s
hermeneutical anticipations that can be transformed through research just as the
self’s anticipations about the other should be revised in encountering the other.30
This is not only a methodological issue, as a world-picture is rooted in and expresses
a life.31 Dilthey’s comparative morphology of life- and world-pictures leads to the
elucidation of their living nexus and experiential context.32
This comparative coordinating strategy also informs Dilthey’s response to the
question of relativism. The antinomies within a scientific world-picture and the con-
tradictions between world-pictures are not resolvable by conceptual theorizing because
they are expressions of human life in its diversity and perspectivality.33 The self-
interpretation of a world-picture leads Dilthey to judge metaphysical and cognitive-
theoretical propositions to be an expression (Ausdruck) of life and lived-experience.
Metaphysics, or “philosophy” including Dilthey’s hermeneutical experientialism,
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cannot resolve the conflict of worlds; life and world stances and their conflict are
constitutive of the dynamics and perspectives of life itself.34 The resolution of
the antinomy in a projected systematic totality is to suppress the differences con-
stitutive of life.35 Instead of a systematic totality that suppresses what is thought to
be contingent, Dilthey appeals for an epistemic humility.36 Dilthey identifies with the
cultivation of a tragic sensibility that is an openness to the world and the irresolvable
differences and conflicts of life.37
Dilthey affirms preserving key insights from German idealism while rejecting the
idealist priority of consciousness over embodied worldly life. Life not only projects
and forms a world out of its own consciousness, or self-existence, its world is always
already there (da) for it.38 The world is inevitably present and there as a whole for
the self in one way or another.39 The self is not constituted in self-reflection alone
but in consciousness, and reflection is a response to its exteriority, facticity, and
worldliness.40 Life becomes a world through the irremovable experience of resis-
tance and reversal.41
Georg Misch contrasted Dilthey’s “thereness” in the midst of life and Heidegger’s
transcendental and impersonal “it worlds.” Thereness is not a “worlding of the world”
that absorbs the individual, but the formation of an individual reality and individua-
tion of a world for a co-relational self.42 This formation of a world for a life centers on
the feeling, thought, and will of the individual and the relation of the body to its world
rooted in the senses and the bodily feeling of life.43 Dilthey describes here the trau-
matic emergence of the self through its differentiation from the world in resistance and
the exposure to facticity of its receptive spontaneity and vitality.
Dilthey argued for the crucial role of receptive spontaneity in contrast to the
dichotomy between active spontaneity and passive receptivity. Receptivity and spon-
taneity are a continuum, conditional, and presuppose each other.44 Therefore, life is
first there in the tension of non-identity, in the reflexive awareness of the self in its
feeling of something exterior and resistant to itself.45 Self-feeling and self-
consciousness arise and presuppose resistance and the externality of an environing
world.46 The “internal” human world is accordingly not an ideational or spiritual
construct. It is constituted through social-historically formed practical goods, inter-
ests, norms, purposes, and values.47 A world is mediated through material, social, and
symbolic relations. A world is felt and lived and not merely a conceptual, ideational,
or representational object.48 Life interestedly cares about and understands its own life
from out of itself and in response to others. It is structured in part by human activities
and purposiveness and yet Dilthey’s “lifeworld” has no teleological determination in
an unfolding of an ultimate end or purpose in his philosophy of history.49
History and biography are the most suitable means for expressing and provoking
the self-reflection of life. All sciences have an element of art in being practices, but
some are more thoroughly artistic, employing all of our spontaneity and respon-
siveness. Poetry and the other arts provide the most powerful and moving insights
into life and the individual’s formation of a world-picture. Art and literature are
nearest and most expressive of the self-presentation of life in its fullness and
complexity.50 Art-works do not only express life, they amplify and enhance it and
disclose its further possibilities that often remain unseen and unheard in the course
of daily life. Art is the richest articulation of the forces of the imagination. It is the
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imagination that approaches the singular without eradicating it in a non-coercive
juxtaposition of singulars.51
The worlds experienced in art, religion, and philosophy involve the transforma-
tion – through extension and intensification as well as abridgement and impoverish-
ment – of the feeling of life. The “internal” feeling of life is confronted by exteriorities
that resist, threaten, and undermine it, including the irreducible exteriority and facti-
city of death.52 Endeavors to systematically comprehend and organize the world as a
whole must lead to aporia because of the finite and horizon-bound character of
human life. Dilthey concluded his philosophy of worldviews with the proposal that
philosophy can only be personal and individual in the end even while expressing what
seems impersonal and universal.53 A world is not an organized system of abstract
concepts; a world is formed and experienced through a fundamental mood (Grund-
stimmung) and disposition (Gemütsverfassung), which conceptualization and reflection
can in turn effect.54 Moods affectively orient the picturing the world as it is formed
and individualized in its epochal and generational contexts.55
6. The plurality and conflict of worlds?
Another conception that emerged from Dilthey’s hermeneutics is the idea that there
is a fundamental conflict (Streit, Widerstreit) between worldviews, life-tendencies, and
interpretive orientations. Heidegger maintains that Dilthey did not comprehend
this conflict decisively enough. Heidegger expounded his most adamant critique of
Dilthey in his lecture course Introduction to Philosophy. Heidegger here reasons against
understanding the world and world-picturing through the multiplicity of ontic dif-
ferences for the sake of a more originary ontological difference. He problematizes
the ontic differences of the empirical expressed by Dilthey.56 A worldview is not an
observational interpretive response to multiplicity for Heidegger; it is primarily
world-intuition (Welt-anschauen) and a factically gripped being-in-the-world.57
Observation and empirical inquiry presuppose encountering and confronting the
world, but the encounter can repeat, miss, or be transformed in the encounter such
that the empirical ontic dimension should not be dismissed. This encounter prior to
inquiry is understood as intuition in traditional thought. Dilthey stressed the inter-
pretive formation of worldviews, whereas Heidegger emphasized their being intuited.
Heidegger returns to a phenomenological intuition quite different than Dilthey’s
empirical interpretive strategies. Heidegger describes intuition as deferred through
not grasping rather than an immediate grasping.58
Heidegger contends that a worldview is not formed out of multiple and hetero-
geneous aspects and elements. It is not of “diverse provenance” but an originary
unified phenomenon in the transcendence of Dasein in its nothingness and eccentric
and ecstatic lack of bearing.59 Dasein is in each case betrayed and threatened in its
transcendence-in-the-world, or in “the each time of the facticity of transcendence.”60
Dasein does not primarily ontically observe and inquire, it is ontically involved
because it primordially understands and “intuits the world.”61 Human existence,
understood as being-there (Da-sein), is each time an intuiting of world. It is a having
and not having of the world that it itself is. Worldview is often reified into
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something objectively present, as a fulfilled possessing of the world. Opposing
popular tendencies to reify dynamic world picturings into static ideological
“viewpoints,” Heidegger shows how worldview expresses the lack of bearing of
being-there. To have a world is equally to be decentered into the world.62
Worldview is further misinterpreted for Heidegger in the idea of a “natural
worldview.” There can be no one natural worldview upon which a historically
formed worldview is then additionally grafted, as little as there can be a Dasein that
would not be the Dasein of the self and thereby dispersed in relations of self and
other (Ich-Du).63 Heidegger’s denial of a natural worldview extends beyond Dilthey’s
analysis, as Dilthey interprets naturalistic world-picturing to be an expression of life
(Lebensäußerung). As the manifestation of a form of life, instead of a theoretical
grasping of it, naturalism has its own cogency that cannot be disproved. Dilthey
concluded that naturalism is one expressive possibility of life among others, even if
there can be no one unified natural worldview shared by all humans. Naturalism is
one expression and enactment of the truth and only untruthful when it overextends
itself and takes on a dogmatic totalizing metaphysical form. A worldview is essen-
tially historical for Dilthey and Heidegger, but for Dilthey this entails that it is irre-
ducibly individual and worthy of recognition for itself.
The empirical ontic multiplicity of worldviews is pertinent to any given picturing of
the world, which is confronted by and recognizes or disavows other ways of picturing
the world. Dilthey noticed that the historicity of worldviews entails that there is no
master worldview from which to neutrally rank others. Persons are confronted with
the incommensurability, difference, and conflict of worldviews that make a unified
thinking of being impossible and undesirable, because they are inevitably participants
in and party to agonistic life. That is why, notwithstanding their affinity, Heidegger
increasingly sided with the hermeneutic conservatism of Graf Paul Yorck von War-
tenburg and his drive toward ontology against Dilthey’s “liberal” and “tolerant”
hermeneutics with its ontic pluralism born of interpretive humility and charity.64
7. Conclusion: a plural world
Heidegger interpreted modernity and globalization as a historical event of Being in
“The Age of the World Picture” (1938). Modernity occurs as a questionable leveling
and totalizing of a consolidating and enframing (Ge-stell) “world-picture.” By con-
trast, Dilthey showed how there is inevitably indeterminacy in and resistance to the
pre-determined and totalized. There is, he argues, no pre-given or pre-established
determinate system or universal concept that can sublimate all individuals, affairs,
and situations. There is no “one” or “the” world but a multiplicity of overlapping,
intersecting, and conflicting worlds. A world-picture is not a constant self-same
identity unmoved by experience and conflict, as feeling, experience, and encounter
historically transform world-pictures in relation to each other. There can as a result
neither be one beginning, teleology nor end of history.
It could be asked in conclusion: Can there be then a world-formation and world-
cultivation (Bilden, Bildung), centered in the “already known” (Erkannte) of local
traditions and cultures, and nonetheless creative and responsive to the new and
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alternate? Can there be a “global” transnational community – as a pluralistic and
multicultural sensus communis or Gemeinschaft – originating from the interplay, con-
flicts, and reflection of particular forms of life and world-pictures that are open and
responsive to one another? Is a formation of life possible that brings diverse indivi-
duals and communities affectively and reflectively into shared relations in which
individuality and communities can flourish? Such questions cannot be adequately
addressed here.65 But it might well be the case that a thoroughgoing reconstruction
of Dilthey’s hermeneutics is more appropriate for encountering and engaging the
diversity of life and plurality of worlds necessary in the contemporary world than
the ontological hermeneutics that dominated the twentieth century.
Notes
1 See Moran, D. (2013). “From the Natural Attitude to the Life-World,” in L. Embree and
T. Nenon (eds.), Husserl’s Ideen, Dordrecht: Springer, 105–24.
2 Kierkegaard, S. (1998). ‘The Moment’ and Late Writings, trans. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 143.
3 Dilthey, W. (1970). Leben Schleiermachers: Auf Grund des Textes der 1. Auflage von 1870 und
der Zusätze aus dem Nachlaß, ed. M. Redeker, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, GS
13/1: 1. References to Wilhelm Dilthey’s works are to: Gesammelte Schriften, 28 vols. Göt-
tingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1914–2011; English translations, when available, are
from Makkreel, R. A. and Rodi F. (eds.), (1985f). Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works, Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
4 Gesammelte Schriften 7: 199 / Selected Works III: 221.
5 Dilthey, W. (1959). Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften: Versuch einer Grundlegung für das
Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte, ed. B. Groethuysen, 4th edition, Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Gesammelte Schriften 1: 51 / English Translation: Dilthey, W.
(1989). Introduction to the Human Sciences, ed. R. A. Makkreel and F. Rodi, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, Selected Works I: 101; Dilthey, W. (1957). Die Geistige Welt:
Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens. Erste Hälfte: Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der Geis-
teswissenschaften, ed. G. Misch, 2nd edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht,
Gesammelte Schriften 5: 60; Dilthey, W. (1956). Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den
Geisteswissenschaften, ed. B. Groethuysen. 2nd edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und
Ruprecht, Gesammelte Schriften 7: 135.
6 Dilthey, W. (1960). Weltanschauungslehre: Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie, ed.
B. Groethuysen, 2nd edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Gesammelte Schriften
8: 99.
7 Gesammelte Schriften 1: 65 / Selected Works I: 115. Compare Makkreel, R. A. (1985). “The
Feeling of Life: Some Kantian Sources of Life-Philosophy,” Dilthey-Jahrbuch 3: 83–104.
8 See Nelson, E. S. (2012). “Dilthey and Carnap: Empiricism, Life-Philosophy, and Over-
coming Metaphysics,” Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 23: 20–49; Nelson, E. S. (2013).
“Heidegger and Carnap: Disagreeing about Nothing?” in F. Raffoul and E. S. Nelson (eds.),
Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, London: Bloomsbury Press, 151–6.
9 Neurath, O., Carnap, R. et al. (2006). “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung,” in M. Sto?
ltzner (ed.), Wiener Kreis Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, Hamburg: Meiner, 27.
10 Husserl, E. (1950). Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke: Formale und transzendentale Logik, Den
Haag: M. Nijhoff, 243. Compare Gander, H.-H. (2006). Selbstversta?ndnis und Lebenswelt:
Grundzu?ge einer pha?nomenologischen Hermeneutik im Ausgang von Husserl und Heidegger,
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 137.
11 Husserl, 1950, 243. Compare Lawlor, L. (2002). Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of
Phenomenology, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 163.
12 Husserl, 1950, 243.
LIFE AND WORLD
387
13 Føllesdal, D. (2009). “The Lebenswelt in Husserl,” in D. Hyder and H.-J. Rheinberger
(eds.), Science and the Life-World: Essays on Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 27.
14 Makkreel, R. A. (1985) “Lebenswelt und Lebenszusammenhang,” in E. W Orth (ed.), Dil-
they und Philosophie der Gegenwart, Freiburg/Münich: Karl Alber, 381–413.
15 The following discussion draws on my more extensive discussion of world and world-
view in Dilthey and Heidegger in Nelson, E. S. (2011). “The World Picture and its Con-
flict in Dilthey and Heidegger,” Humana Mente, 18: 19–38. Also see Nelson, E. S. (2013).
“Heidegger and Dilthey: A Difference in Interpretation,” in François Raffoul and E. S.
Nelson (eds.), Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, London: Bloomsbury Press, 129–34;
and Nelson, E. S. (2013). “Dilthey, Heidegger und die Hermeneutik des faktischen
Lebens,” in G. Scholtz (ed.), Diltheys Werk und seine Wirkung, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 97–110.
16 Gesammelte Schriften 1: xvii / Selected Works I: 50.
17 Gesammelte Schriften 1: xvii / Selected Works I: 50.
18 Gesammelte Schriften 1: 9 / Selected Works I: 61.
19 Gesammelte Schriften 1: 9–10, 15 / Selected Works I: 61–62, 67.
20 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 38, 96.
21 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 3.
22 Heidegger, M. (2001). Einleitung in die Philosophie, ed. Ina Saame-Speidel, Gesamtausgabe 27,
2nd edition, Frankfurt: Klostermann: 344–68.
23 Gesammelte Schriften 1: 9–12 / Selected Works I: 61–4.
24 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 5, 75.
25 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 9.
26 Horowitz, I. L. (1989). Persuasions and Prejudices: An Informal Compendium of Modern Social
Science, 1953–1988, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 28–9.
27 Naugle, D. K. (2002).Worldview: The History of a Concept, Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 87.
28 Gesamtausgabe 27: 346–7.
29 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 86, 99.
30 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 99–100.
31 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 78.
32 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 8.
33 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 8. On human diversity, see Marom, A. (2013). “Universality, Par-
ticularity, and Potentiality: The Sources of Human Divergence as Arise from Wilhelm
Dilthey’s Writings,” Human Studies, 36, 3: 1–13.
34 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 98.
35 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 24.
36 The idea of “epistemic humility” has been developed by Langton, R. (2001). Kantian
Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves, Oxford: Oxford University Press. On Dil-
they’s hermeneutical reformulation of Kantian epistemic humility, see Nelson, E. S. (2014).
“Language, Nature, and the Self: The Feeling of Life in Kant and Dilthey,” in F. Schalow
and R. Velkley (eds.), The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought: Historical and Critical
Essays. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 263–287.
37 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 71.
38 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 16.
39 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 43.
40 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 39.
41 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 16–18.
42 Misch, G. (1931). Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung der Dil-
they’schen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 247; Compare Gesam-
melte Schriften 8: 79.
43 Dilthey, W. (1977). Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte:
Vorarbeiten zur Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1865–1880), ed. H. Johach and F.
Rodi, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Gesammelte Schriften 18: 175.
44 Gesammelte Schriften 5: 84; Gesammelte Schriften 18: 156.
ERIC S. NELSON
388
45 Gesammelte Schriften 18: 157–8.
46 Gesammelte Schriften 18: 166.
47 Gesammelte Schriften 1: 9 / Selected Works I: 61.
48 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 17.
49 Compare Beiser, F. C. (2011). The German Historicist Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 356. Also compare Heidegger’s quasi-teleological meta-narrative of the philosophy
of history discussed in Nelson, E. S. (2014). “Heidegger, Levinas, and the Other of His-
tory,” in J. E. Drabinski and E. S. Nelson (eds.), Between Levinas and Heidegger. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 51–72.
50 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 26.
51 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 26–7. On the exemplary role of aesthetics for Dilthey, see Makk-
reel, R. A. (1986). “Tradition and Orientation in Hermeneutics,” Research in Phenomenol-
ogy, 16: 73–85.
52 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 45–6, 53, 79, 81.
53 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 32.
54 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 33.
55 Gesammelte Schriften 8: 35, 82.
56 Compare Friedman, M. (2000). A Parting of Ways, Chicago: Open Court, 140–2.
57 Gesamtausgabe 27: 344.
58 Gesamtausgabe 27: 344.
59 Gesamtausgabe 27: 354.
60 Gesamtausgabe 27: 358, 367.
61 Gesamtausgabe 27: 367–8, 382–90.
62 Gesamtausgabe 27: 344–5.
63 Gesamtausgabe 27: 344–5.
64 See Gadamer, H. G. (1995). Hermeneutik in Rückblick, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 9 and 186.
65 I discuss such issues of intercultural hermeneutics in Nelson, E. S. (2012). “Heidegger,
Misch, and the Origins of Philosophy,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 39, Supplement: 10–30.
LIFE AND WORLD
389
